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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

l

SALT LAKE CITY,
a municipal corporation,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.
Case No.
)
11,948
UNITED PARK CITY
MINES COMP ANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and
Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This case involves the underground interference
with waters naturally tributary to Big Cottonwood
Creek in Salt Lake County by means of defendant's
mine workings in the Park City area. The action
was brought
( 1) to quiet plaintiff's title to its prior
vested rights to the use of the waters naturally
tributary to Big Cottonwood Creek which are
intercepted and drained away by means of the
Spiro Tunnel and its connected underground
workings and facilities (R. 318) and
(2) (a) to enjoin defendant from intercepting and draining away by means of the
1

Spiro. Tunnel and.
connected
workmgs and facilities the waters which ar
naturally tributary to Big Cottonwood Creel
and from depleting the natural
naturally supply plaintiff\
rights m Big Cottonwood Creek (R. 318 319)·
or in the alternative
' '
(b) ordering defendant to replact
to plaintiff at defendant's sole cost and ex.
pense the waters naturally tributary to Bii
Cottonwood Creek which are being intercepW
and drained away by means of the Spiro Tun.
nel and its connected underground
(R. 319).
Plaintiff disclaimed any interest in and to the water!
intercepted by means of the first 6600 feet of the
Spiro Tunnel measured from the portal thereof (R
319.) The water rights of plaintiff in Big Cotton·
wood Creek were essentially conceded by defendanl
and no issue was tried thereon (R. 321). Thus, the
issues tried (R. 321, 322) were resolved down to
( 1) has there been an unnatural loss in
the flow of waters on Big Cottonwood Creek'!
( 2) If so, what is the causal connection,
if any, between this loss and the flow of
from the Spiro Tunnel (excluding the
flowing from the first 6600 feet of the .Tunnell
and its connected underground workmgs?
( 3) If there is any such
connec·
tion between a loss in the flow of Big
wood Creek and the water flow from the
Tunnel, is plaintiff entitled to a decree qmet·
ing title in plaintiff to any part of such
and, if so, how much?
2

( 4) Who has the burden of proof with
respect to determining the source of waters
flowing from the Spiro Tunnel?
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried without a jury and covered
approximately three weeks of trial with 179 Exhibits and over 2,100 pages of transcript of testimony.
Thereupon the lower court issued a 143 page Memorandum Decision (R. 152-295 incl.) with an attached 20 page Appendix (R. 296-315 incl.) and prepared !-J court exhibits (Court's Exhibits I-IX incl.), all
of which boiled down to its conclusion that plaintiff
did not sustain its burden of proving that there had
been an unnatural decrease in the flow of Big Cottonwood Creek since the driving of the Spiro Tunnel
(R. 295). Accordingly the lower court made and
entered 156 pages of Findings Of Fact (R. 316-471,
incl.) ending with the ultimate Finding that plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been an unnatural decrease in
the flow of Big Cottonwood Creek since the driving
of the Spiro Tunnel, which it found dispositive of this
case (R. 471). It then concluded that judgment
should be entered in favor of defendant and against
the plaintiff of '''no cause of action" (R. 471) and,
accordingly, entered its Judgment of "no cause of
action" ( R. 473) . The lower court made no Findings
of Fact on the causal connection between the waters
intercepted by means of the Spiro Tunnel workings
and the waters naturally tributary to Big Cottonwood
3

( 4 71) . Plain tiff timely filed its Objection:
To Fmdmgs Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law and Judi·
men t ( R. 482-484, incl.) and Motion For New
( R. 485, 486) , all of which were overruled and
nied (R. 474). Plaintiff then timely filed its Nofo
Of Appeal herein ( R. 488-489).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
On this appeal appellant seeks
( 1) a reversal df the judgment of "n1,
cause of action" made and entered by the
court.
( 2) a setting aside of its Findings OJ
Fact and Conclusions Of Law on which it1
Judgment is based, and the striking from th1
record of Court's Exhibits I to IX inclusive.
( 3) to have this Court make and enter
Findings Of Fact based upon the record here·
in that
(a) there has been an unnatural
crease in the flow of Big Cottonwooo
Creek in the amount of at least 12 secona
feet at the mouth and 9 second feet al
Argenta;
(b) the Spiro Tunnel and its c?n·
nected underground workings (
the first 6600 feet thereof) intercept ana
divert water which is naturally tributari
to Big Cottonwood Creek; and
( c) 90 % of the flow of
intercepted and collected from Spiro Tunk·
nel and its connected underground wor ·
ings (excluding
first 6600
of) is naturally tributary to Big Cotton
4

wood Creek and that plaintiff is the own.
er thereof.
( 4) to have this Court make and enter
its Conclusions Of Law and Judgment
(a) quieting plaintiff's title to 90%
of the flow of the waters intercepted and
collected by the Spiro Tunnel and its connected underground workings (excluding
the first 6600 feet thereof) ;
(b) enjoining defendent from intercepting and draining away by means of
the Spiro Tunnel and its connected underground workings and facilities the waters
which are naturally tributary to Big Cottonwood Creek and enjoining defendant
from depleting the underground sources
which naturally supply plaintiff's rights
in Big Cottonwood Creek, or in the alternative
( c) ordering defendant to replace to
plaintiff at defendant's sole cost and expense 90% of the flow of the water intercepted and collected by the Spiro Tunnel
and its connected underground workings
(excluding the first 6600 feet thereof).
(5) or in the alternative to (3) and (4)
above remand this case to the trial court with
instructions to make and enter Findings Of
Fact in accordance with paragraph 3 hereinabove and Conclusions Of Law and Judgment
in accordance with paragraph 4 hereinabove;
or
( 6) all of the above failing, a new trial.
As to ( 2) above, appellant submits that 156
pages of Findings Of Fact are unnecessary to a deci5

sion in this case, particularly when such Findings incorporate corresponding provisions of the court's 143
page Memorandum Decision and contains summaries of the evidence, statements and opinions of the
witnesses, comments on their testimony and an evaluation of the evidence. Appellant urges that such
Findings do not find the facts specially as required
by Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P. Furthermore, such Findings contain detailed studies made by the court on its
own and with outside assistance which go beyond the
record in this case and incorporate nine exhibits prepared by the court itself in part with outside assistance. In this regard appellant specifically seeks to
set aside Findings C 2 ( s) and ( t) on pages 143 to
149 thereof (R. 458-464, incl.) and to strike from the
record all of the Court's Exhibits I to IX inclusive.
Likewise appellant specifically seeks to set aside the
Ultimate Finding Of Fact on page 156 (R. 471) as
being unsupported by the evidence.
As to ( 3 ) and ( 4) above, this Court has the
authority to so do since this action is for equitable
relief. Plaintiff and appellant well realizes the burden placed upon the Court thereby. However, the alternative thereto as set forth in ( 5) must be considered in light of the practical problem that the trial
court has already made up its mind based upon in
part at least its own study, which we urge was prejudicial error.
As to the alternative set forth in ( 6) above, ap·
pellant stands ready and willing to retry the whole
6

case if need be in view of the disposition in the lower
court which appellant considers to be a gross injustice
to it and its inhabitants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Needless to say, the complexity of the facts of
the instant case makes most difficult a short and concise statement thereof, particularly in view of the 156
pages of Findings Of Fact made and entered by the
trial court. Even more difficult is to comply with the
traditional appellate rule of stating the facts in the
light most favorable to the defendant and respondent
who prevailed below when, as here, the ultimate finding of the trial court was that plaintiff and appellant
herein failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been an unnatural decrease in
the flow of Big Cottonwood Creek. Be that as it may,
we shall endeavor herein to comply with the spirit
of the traditional rules of review. For simplicity we
shall hereinafter refer to plaintiff and appellant,
Salt Lake City, as the "City" and the defendant and
respondent, United Park City Mines Company, as
the "Mining Company."
The rights to the use of the waters of Big Cottonwood Creek were adjudicated among the claimants
thereteo under the Morse Decree entered by the District Court of Salt Lake County on April 13, 1914 (R.
322). The City has acquired by exchange agreements
over the years essentially all of the primary, surplus
and non-irrigation rights to the use of the waters of
Big Cottonwood Creek except for 8.16 per cent of the
7

primary rights, 27. 78 per cent of the surplus rights
(of which the City controls 2.71 per cent of the primary rights and 6.42 per cent of those surplus rights
by reason of the City stock ownership in the Brown
& Sanford Irrigation Company) and except for 1.90
per cent of the non irrigation season rights (R. 323,
324). Since the City's water rights are measured by
percentages of the flows of Big Cottonwood Creek,
any interference in the total natural flow would necessarily interfere with the City's water rights therefrom (R. 324).
Big Cottonwood Creek drains a canyon area of
50.54 square miles and courses westward down Big
Cottonwood Canyon and into the Salt Lake valley.
The canyon itself extends for about 12 miles in an
east-west direction and is about 5 miles wide in a
north-south direction. At the east end of the canyon
is the so-called Brighton bowl, and the easterly ridge
of the canyon drainage area forms the dividing lines
between Salt Lake County to the west and Summit
and Wasatch Counties to the east ( R. 324).
Adjoining the Big Cottonwood drainage to the
east thereof is situated the Thayne's Canyon drain·
age comprising 3. 74 square miles which naturally
drains the surface waters thereof northeasterly into
the East Canyon draininge, being an upstream tributary to the Weber River (R. 325, Exh. P-2).
The Spiro Tunnel was driven from its portal sit·
uated just north of Park City, Utah in a southwester·
8

Jy direction under the Thayne's Canyon drainage towards the upper Big Cottonwood Creek drainage (R.
327, Exh. P-2). The waters intercepted and collected
by means of the tunnel and its connected underground workings drain northeasterly and are discharged into upstream tributaries of East Canyon
Creek ( Exh. P-2). Construction of the Spiro Tunnel
began in July, 1916 and was completed to 15,536 feet
by 1923 (R. 327). The waters developed in that segment of the tunnel were the subject matter of litigation between water users in the Thayne's Canyon and
East Canyon drainages and defendant's predecessor
in interest in the case of Silver King Consolidated
Mining Company vs. Sutton, et al, reported in 85
Utah 297, 39 P.2d 682, decided May 17, 1934. The
court there adjudicated that the waters intercepted
within the first 6,600 feet of the tunnel were naturally tributary to the Weber River drainage. Accordingly, the City in the instant case disclaimed in open
court any interest in and to those waters intercepted
within the first 6,600 feet of the Spiro Tunnel as
measured from the portal thereof (R. 319, 320).

The Spiro Tunnel extends through a shallow layer of approximately 30 to 50 feet of alluvium ( R.
328) and then penetrates four geologic rock formations from its portal to its face in the following order
and in the distances indicated:
Thayne's formation-2765 feet (R. 328)
Woodside Shale-5135 feet (R. 329)
Park City formation-4800 feet (R. 330)
9

Weber Quartzite-2836 feet to face (R.
330, 331)
The Thayne's formation consists of varying layers and lenses of calcereous sandstone, sandy limestone and shales and is relatively pervious. The average dip of the Thayne's formation is about 20° to
the north, and the strike thereof averages North 50'
west (R. 328).
The Woodside Shale consists of varied colored
fine grained and thinly laminated beds of shale. The
dip and strike of the Woodside Shale conforms to the
dip and strike of the overlying Thayne's formation
(R. 329).
The Park City formation consists of limestone,
sandstone, quartzite and shale interbedded throughout. It contains a layer of black carbonaceous shale
about 130 to 165 feet thick which is exceedingly impervious, the bottom part of which is 500 feet from
the contact of the Park City formation with the Weber quartzite. The dip and strike of the Park City formation conforms to the dip and strike of the overlying formations (R. 330).
The Weber Quartzite consists of relatively fine
grained quartzite and some interbedding of limestones and a few thin calcareous shales. The dip and
strike of the Weber formation conforms to the dip
and strike of the overlying formations (R. 330).
All of the foregoing bedrock formation have
their surface outcrops on the northeasterly slope of
the upper Big Cottonwood Canyon drainage and dip
10

to the northeast into the Park City side (Tr. 13051307 incl., 1460, 1461; Exhs. P-3,P-73, P-7 4, P-75).
Major Tunnel Connections Within The Spiro
1. 1057 Cross cut
The 1057 Cross Cut is a 600 foot tunnel driven
between December, 1925 and June, 1926 from the
Spiro Tunnel at 10,570 feet from its portal and extending easterly therefrom to the West End Shaft of
the Silver King Mine. The West End Shaft is a subsurface shaft which was raised from the Silver King
1400 foot level to the 1057 Cross Cut some 130 feet
above. The West End Shaft was deepened to the Silver King 1900 foot level some 630 feet below the Spiro
Tunnel level. It tops out in the Park City formation
and bottoms in the Weber Quartzite. Water was
pumped up the West End Shaft from 1929 to 1949
into the 1057 Cross Cut, which then flowed by gravity into and out of the Spiro Tunnel to its portal (R.
331, 332).
2. 137 Cross Cut
The 137 Cross Cut begins 13,700 feet from the
portal of the Spiro Tunnel and extends southeasterly
approximately 4,000 feet to and beyond the Silver
Hill Shaft, which bottoms in the Cross Cut ( 1300 foot
level) and extends vertically upwards 800 feet to the
500 foot level with mine workings extending horizontally therefrom at 100 foot levels. The Silver Hill
Shaft tops out in the Alliance Tunnel, which extends
easterly and northeasterly therefrom slightly downgrade to its surface portal in the Walker & Webster
11

Gulch ( R. 332,428, 429).
At approximately 800 feet from the Spiro Tunnel and along the 137 Cross Cut is located the
Thayne's Shaft which was constructed in 1938 and
rises vertically approximately 1800 feet to the surf ace. The Thayne's Shaft bottoms in the Weber Quartzite and cuts up through the Park City formation,
Woodside shale and Thayne's formation. Water drips
into the shaft constantly. Beyond the Thayne's Shaft
the 137 Cross Cut is essentially dry ( R. 333).
3. 143 Drift
The 143 Drift begins 14,300 feet from the portal of the Spiro Tunnel and extends westerly approx·
imately 6, 700 feet to its face. The 143 Drift was commenced in May, 1927 and was completed to its pre·
sent face in 1933. A second branch of the 143 Drift
was completed in 1934 (R. 334). The drift begins in
the Weber Quartzite and extends westerly into the
Park City formation to its face which is about 1,000
feet (horizontally) from the surface divide of the
Big Cottonwood Creek drainage (R. 433, Exh. VVV,
Tr. 1463). The two branches terminate in the vicinity of the West Monitor Shaft approxima:tely 2,300
feet below the surface thereof (R. 439, Exh. RRR).
In 1949 a cave-in occurred near the beginning of the
143 Drift, which now completely blocks access there·
to and has since been inaccessible ( R. 334).
As the 143 Drift was driven water flows were
encountered sporadically at fault systems and when
first encountered the water flow was heavy and then
12

as it drained it subsided to lesser but steady flows.
The maximum flow from the 143 Drift was encountered in 1933 at the time the western extension was
concluded, and the average tunnel flow at that time
was approximately 22.0 cfs (R. 334).
Waters of the Spiro Tunnel

The first water encountered in driving the Spiro
Tunnel was on April 13, 1917 some 2, 765 feet from
its portal at the contact of the Thayne's Formation
and Woodside Shale. The initial flow was 0.88 cfs,
which diminished to 0.25 cfs. The flow reached approximately 2.0 cfs in March, 1918 and maintained
that average until March, 1920 when the tunnel heading reached 12,520 feet, being still within the Park
City Formation but below the black shale layer thereof. Between March, 1920 and February, 1921 the flow
sharply increased to 12.6 cfs when the face reached
14,000 feet from the portal, being within the Weber
Quartzite. The main tunnel was completed to 15,536
feet in 1923 and the flow decreased to 7 cfs. As the
143 Drift was driven between May, 1927 and 1934
through the Park City formation and the Weber
Quartzite the waters developed therein augmented the
flow of the tunnel, which reached a maximum of 22
cfs at the portal during 19f3. However, from 1929 to
July 1949 water was being pumped from the West
End Shaft, thereby augmenting the tunnel flow from
1to 9 cfs. The flow of the tunnel remained between 12
and 14 cfs until July, 1944, decreasing to 5.7 cfs in
1951 and thereafter remained relatively constant
13

with a high of 9.4 cfs in 1952 and a low of 6.2 cfs in
1962. From 1964 through 1966 the flow of the tunnel
ranged between 6.8 and 9.8 cfs ( R. 335, 336, 338-341
incl. Exhs. 58,59).
The waters in question are those developed beyond the black shale of the Park City formation beginning 12,220 feet from the portal and continuing
through the remainder of the Park City formation
and into the Weber Quartzite to the innermost workings. Of prinicpal concern are the waters developed
within the 143 Drift, the West End Shaft and the 137
Cross Cut, including the Thayne's Shaft (R. 341).
A substantial part of the evidence offered by
both parties related to the preliminary question of
whether there had been an unnatural decrease in the
flow of Big Cottonwood Creek since the driving of
the Spiro Tunnel. The trial court devoted some 98
pages of its Findings Of Fact in summarizing the
evidence offered by both the City and the Mining
Company as to whether there had been such unnatural decrease (R. 342-439 incl.). The trial court then
devoted some 31 pages to an evaluation of the evidence offered by both parties ( R. 440-4 70 incl.), with
no indication as to how the court would find until the
143rd page (R. 458). Thereafter it devotes some 7
pages ( R. 458-464 incl.) to a discussion of a wholly
separate study made by the court itself with outside
help in which it followed a procedure outlined in Geological Survey Water Supply Paper 1541-B (not in
evidence) and with the use of a computer at the Uni14

versity of Utah computed its own coefficients (R.
464) and determined its own equation (R. 462), and
in the process prepared on its own 9 court exhibits
(Court's Exhibits I-IX incl.). Thereupon the trial
court made its ultimate finding that the City failed
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
there had been an unnatural decrease in the flow of
Big Cottonwood Creek ( R. 471) .
There was no evidence offered to show that any
particular spring or seep in the Big Cottonwood
drainage had dried up after the driving of the Spiro
Tunnel and its connected workings (R. 452). Contrary to the findings of the trial court, direct evidence
was offered by the City to show that the natural flow
of Big Cottonwood Creek itself had decreased since
the driving of the Spiro Tunnel. The bulk of the evidence offered by both parties centered around a variety of stream flow comparisons as indirect proof of
whether Big Cottonwood Creek had sustained an unnatural decrease.
The City's evidence boiled down into the following major categories:
1. Basic Data
(a) Exhibits P-1 to P-7, inclusive, comprise composite aerial photographs, topographical maps, surface geologic maps, relief models and diagrams showing the basic physical
features of the Big Cottonwood Creek drainage and the Thayne's Canyon drainage.
(b) Exhibits P-8 to P-13, inclusive, P-15
15

and P-95 comprise a compilation of stream
flow records of Big Cottonwood Creek at the
mouth and at Argenta, Little Cottonwood
Creek, Mill Creek, Parley's Creek and City
Creek and United States Weather Bureau records on precipitation.
( c) Exhibits P-54 to P-59, inclusive,
comp1•ise a map of Salt Lake City's water shed
and measuring stations, charts and maps of
the Spiro Tunnel and connected workings and
hydrographs of the discharge of the waters
from the Spiro Tunnel from 1917 to 1966, except for the period August, 1944 to December,
1950.
(d) Exhibits P-60 and P-62 comprise
compilations and a graph of the discharge of
water per unit area of the various water sheds.
( e) Exhibits P-87 to P-89, inclusive, comprise precipitation maps from 1931 to 1960 for
the State of Utah and the upper Big Cottonwood Creek drainage.
2. Stream Flow Comparisons
(a) Exhibits P-16 to P-19, inclusive,
comprise hydrographs of part of the basic data,
comparing measured discharge of Big Cotton·
wood Creek, Little Cottonwood Creek and City
Creek, and daily discharges of Big Cottonwood
Creek at Argenta.
(b) Exhibits P-21 to P-43, inclusive,
comprise a series of graphs known as double
mass curves, plotting the accumulated measured discharges in acre feet of one stream against
another for a number of the Wasatch front
streams.
( c) Exhibit P-61 consists of a hydro·
16

graph of a part of the basic data, comparing
the flow of Big Cottonwood Creek at Argenta
with the discharge of the Spiro Tunnel from
1916 to 1963, with five year averages.
(d) Exhibit P-62 consists of a bar graph
comparing run-off per unit area of water shed
among the various streams, i n c 1u d i n g
Thayne's Canyon.
( e) Exhibit P-44 to P-53, inclusive, comprise graphs comparing precipitation with annual run-off and computed run-off with the
annual run-off for Big Cottonwood Creek and
Little Cottomvood Creek with residual curves.
3. Opinion Testimony
(a) Testimony from the witness John A.
Ward, Ground Water Engineer, in explanation of the above basic data and stream flow
comparisons, and opinions as to the decrease in
the flow of Big Cottonwood Creek and the
causal connection with the Spiro Tunnel and
connected underground workings.
(b) Testimony of the witness Ray E.
Marsell, Geologist, in explanation of the above
basic data, surface and subsur:f ace geology and
the causal connection between the interception
of waters in the Spiro Tunnel and connected
working and the natural drainage of Big Cottonwood Creek.
The Mining Company's evidence fell into essentially the same categories as the City's. It consisted
of additional basic data comprising further stream
flow records and precipitation records, publications,
handbooks and a series of hydrographs comprising
double mass curves of stream flow comparisons and
17

the like. However, the Mining Company did not sub.
mit double mass curves comparing effective precipi.
tation with annual run-off or comparing computed
run-off with measured run-off or residual curves as
did the City under paragraph 2 ( e) above, nor did it
submit graphs comparing run-off per unit area of
water sheds as did the City under paragraph 2(d)
above.
In its analysis of the evidence that there has been
an unnatural decrease in the flow of Big Cottonwood
Creek, the trial court found :
( 1) That the City's double mass curves
comparing the accumulated discharges of Big
Cottonwood Creek with City Creek, Mill Creek
and Little Cottonwood Creek both for the water year (October 1 - September 30) and winter flows (October 1 - March 31) show a divergence away from the Big Cottonwood Creek
coordinate both at the mouth and at Argenta
beginning primarily between 1924 and 1927
(R. 447, 448).
(2) Comparisons of winter flows of Big
Cottonwood Creek at Argenta with the discharge of the Spiro Tunnel show that the flow
at Argenta substantially decreased between
1929 and 1934, which was the year the 1.43
Drift was completed, and thereafter slowly increased as the discharge from the Spiro Tunnel decreased, with Argenta reaching its record low in 1935, within a year after the 143
Drift was completed and when the Spiro Tun·
nel reached its maximum flow during the 48year period ( R. 449).
18

( 3) Comparisons of run-off per unit
area of water shed show Big Cottonwood Creek
drainage above Argenta was substantially less
than Mill D South Fork, upper Mill Creek or
City Creek (R. 449).
( 4) The water year run-off of Big Cottonwood Creek was substantially greater than
Little Cottonwood Creek prior to 1932, but
thereafter the difference was greatly reduced
(R. 449).
( 5) The effective precipitation graphs
on their face show a cumulative decrease in
run-off from Big Cottonwood Creek at the
mouth and at Argenta beginning in 1931,
whereas Little Cottonwood Creek shows no
similar decrease (R. 449, 450).
( 6) Precipitation in the upper Big Cottonwood Creek drainage far exceeds that on
the Spiro Tunnel side ( R. 450) .
(7) The opinion of the expert witness
John A. Ward was that there had been an unnatural decrease in Big Cottonwood Creek of
12 to 15 cfs at the mouth and 9 to 12 cfs at Argenta and that 90% of the flow of the Spiro
Tunnel was Big Cottonwood water (R. 450,
451).
(8) The opinion of the expert witness
Ray E. Marsell was that 90% of the water
emanating from the 143 Drift has its origin
in the ground water reservoir which if not
thereby intercepted would contribute to Big
Cottonwood Creek as would waters collected
in the 137 Cross Cut north of the Crescent
Fault and the water pumped from the West
End Shaft ( R. 451).
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( 9) Defendant's witness Jay Bagley
concluded from defendant's double mass curves
that a real change in Big Cottonwood Creek
flow occurred from 1928 to 1935 and also that
a 1920 break could have been caused by the
Spiro Tunnel ( R. 452 ) .
( 10) Comparisons of run-off taken from
the basic data and grouped into 8, 16 and 24
year intervals show, with some exceptions, that
the flow in Big Cottonwood Creek at both Argenta and at the mouth generally was less than
for other Wasatch front streams ( R. 452).
( 11) Extensive faulting in the Park
City area, some of which extends into the Big
Cottonwood area, suggests channels exist
through which water from the Big Cottonwood
Creek drainage can find its way into the Park
City area (R. 452).
In its analysis of the evidence that there has been
no unnatural decrease in the flow of Big Cottonwood
Creek, the trial court found:
( 1) No evidence that any particular
spring, seep or stream in the Big Cottonwood
Creek drainage area was reduced in flow or
dried up following the driving of the Spiro
Tunnel ( R. 452) .
( 2) A series of what the trial court
sidered to be uncertainties or inconsistencies
between several of the double mass curves offered by the City, including the observation
that such comparisons show that if Big Cotton·
wood Creek sustained an unnatural decrease
so did Mill Creek ( R. 452-455 incl.).
(3) That no recording device was main·
tained a:t the Argenta station prior to 1928,
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that in years subsequent thereto the recording
device did not always work and that discrepancies existed between the City's recorded
flows and the record flows of Utah Power &
Light Company at the stairs ( R. 455).
( 4) Comparisons of the winter flows of
Big Cottonwood Creek at Argenta and the discharge of the Spiro Tunnel, considering pumping from the West End Shaft, suggest a causal
connection between the Argenta source water
and the mine workings at the bottom of the
West End Shaft ( R. 456) .
( 5) The City's run-off per square mile
comparisons are open to question because of a
one month overlap in the period of comparison
and rliff erences in the drainage areas compared (R. 457).
( 6) That inconsistencies appeared in the
City's method of determining effective precipitation and inaccuracies appear on the City's
Exhibit P-45 plotting effective precipitation
against measured run-off. Thereupon the trial
court conducted its own study determining coefficients, using a computer at the University
of Utah to determine equations, and prepared
nine Court's Exhibits which the trial court
found produced a different result than plaintiff's corresponding Exhibits (R. 458-464,
incl.).
(7) That the accumulated discharge of
the Spiro Tunnel, after deducting the waters
pumped from the West End Shaft, show a
quantity less than plaintiff's Exhibits show the
accumulated loss in Big Cottonwood Creek,
which raised the question as to what happened
to the balance of the water ( R. 465, 466).
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(8) That the City's expert witnesses
John A. Ward and Ray E. Marsell gave no con.
sideration to the fact that if the Spiro Tunnel
had caused a decrease in the Wasatch front
streams it caused an equal or greater decrease
in the flow of Mill Creek ( R. 467, 468).
( 9) The double mass curves of defendant
do not produce the same results as the plaintiff's and tend to offset the weight thereof (R.
468).
( 10) That exhibits offered by the Min·
ing Company suggest that Big Cottonwood
Creek has no noticeable different decline than
other streams, except Little Cottonwood Creek,
although the interval of comparison may tend
to offset such decrease. Also such exhibits show
that a drouth occurred in the 1930's and a
downward trend in water supply within the
Great Basin leading up to the drouth (R. 468,
469).
( 11) The opinion of defendant's expert
witness Jay Bagley admitted to a real change
in the flow of Big Cottonwood Creek between
1929 and 1934 which could have been caused
by other tunnel workings, including the Was·
atch Drain Tunnel and the West End Shaft,
and that in his opinion such change was no
more than 1 to 3 cfs ( R. 469, 4 70).
(12) That there is evidence that the We·
ber Quartzite is not an acquifer as such and
that mines on the northern slopes of Big Cot·
tonwood Canyon suggest a lack of under·
ground water in these areas ('R. 47).
( 13) That great quantities of water had
been drained from the Park City area long be·
fore the Spiro Tunnel was driven (R. 470).
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Thereupon the trial court made its ultimate finding that the City had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been an unnatural
decrease in the flow of Big Cottonwood Creek since
the driving of the Spiro Tunnel, which it concluded
was dispositive of the case making it unnecessary for
the court to make findings upon other issues of fact
(R. 471).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GOING OUTSIDE OF THE RECORD IN CONDUCTING A
SEPARATE STUDY OF COMPARISONS BETWEEN PRECIPITATION AND RUN-OFF
WITH THE USE OF A COMPUTER AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH

A careful reading of the 156 pages of Findings
Of Fact reveals that up until page 143 thereof the
reader cannot discern which way the trial court was
going to find. At that point the trial court began its
analysis of Exhibit P-45 as the foundation for the
City's comparisons between precipitation and run-off
in the Big Cottonwood Creek drainage. This was a
very crucial point because the City's exhibits demonstrated a change in relationship between precipitation and run-off in Big Cottonwood Creek in the
year 1931 (R. 450) and the Mining Company did not
offer comparable comparison exhibits.
In analyzing this evidence the trial court became
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concerned about how the .11 carry-over coefficient
for Big Cottonwood Creek was determined by Peck
as shown by Exhibit N, Table 5 at page 23 thereof
and ignored the fact that such carry-over coefficient
was placed in evidence by the Mining Company (Tr.
1612) and having been used by the City was accepted
as valid and accurate by both parties. And as noted
in Exhibit N those carry-over coefficients were experimentally determined by Peck from a multiple
correlation of the water stream flow of each particular creek and the Weather Bureau's seasonal indices
of precipitation for the current year and the preceding year (Exhibit N, page 22) . However, instead of
accepting the coefficient already in evidence as it
should have done, the trial court resorted to Geological Survey Water Supply Paper 1541-B, which is not
in evidence and cannot be judicially noticed (78-25-1,
U.C.A. 1953), and by the use of empirical formulae
taken therefrom the trial court set out to develop its
own coefficients, which it ultimately did, i.e., a=
0.82 and b = 0.18 (R. 464).
The trial court then noted from non-evidentiary
Water Supply Paper 1541-B that yearly values of
effective annual precipitation should be used, whereas the City used October through April precipitation
( R. 458). Yet the trial court ignored the very im·
portant fact that the Peck study as used by the City
was based upon the October through April precipita·
tion (Tr. 954). Likewise the carry-over coefficients
developed by Peck specifically for Big Cottonwood
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Creek and Little Cottonwood Creek as used by the
City are based upon the preceding October through
April precipitation (Tr. 954, 955, 973, 97 4, 975).
Next the trial court referred to non-evidentiary
Water Supply Paper 1541-B and notes therefrom
that the effective precipitation commonly itsed is a
proportion of the current year's precipitation plus
the proportion of the preceding year's precipitation
that furnishes the current year run-off and that the
coefficients used must equal unity, whereas the method used by the City made no deduction for the
amount of the current year's precipitation which
would contribute to next year's run-off (R. 459).
However, the trial court either overlooked or ignored
the fact that the City did not use the total annual precipitation but only the October through April portion
thereof. Thus, in using the Peck study as the City did,
1
'the coefficient for the current year is 1.00 for every
stream" (Exh. N, page 22). The fallacy of the trial
court's analysis was its attempt to apply empirical
formulae obtained outside of the record predicated
on total annual precipitation to experimentally determined formulae and coefficients predicated on October through April precipitation. Of course, they are
not the same.
Then the trial court notes that a careful examination of the points plotted by the City on Exhibit
P-45 reveals that noticeable differences appear with
respect to 42 out of 48 of the measured run-off coordinates when compared with Exhibits P-8, P-11
25

and P-12 for the corresponding years ( R. 460). How.
ever, Exhibit P-45 is a graph plotting annual (Jan.
uary 1 - December 31) run-off of Big Cottonwood
Creek versus effective precipitation at Brighton (Tr.
954), whereas the totals shown on Exhibits P-8, P-11
and P-12 are for the water year (October 1 to September 30). A comparison between the anniwJ runoff as computed from Exhibit P-8 and the equivalent
points on Exhibit P-45 reveals that the same are accurate save and except that the year labled ''39" near
the center of the graph should read "49." Be that as
it may, the erroneous assumption made by the trial
court that Exhibit P-45 plotted the water year runoff led the trial court to question the accuracy of Exhibit P-45 (R. 460).
With the stage having thus been set, the trial
court took off on an almost unbelievable mathematical escapade in a determined effort not only to math·
ematically prove that the City's exhibits were in error
but to also prove the Peck coefficients to be in error.
This it did as a result of a series of erroneous assump·
tions which became irreversible and points up the pit·
falls of the court's going to sources outside of the
record and attempting to become more expert than
the expert witnesses.
First the trial court looked to Water Supply Pa·
per 1541-B for the empirical formula of the equation
(Y =a+ bX) of the City's balanced line on Exhibit
P-45 and approximated the equation of that line (R.
460). Next it attempted to mathematically deter·
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mine the equation of the City's balanced line, using
the "least squares" method which it took from Water
Supply Paper 1541-B (R. 461). In so doing it used
the City's effective precipitation as plotted on Exhibit P-45 and the water year (October 1 - September
30) run-off as taken from Exhibits P-11 and P-12
and computed the respective values of the parameters
from which it mathematically computed the equation
for that line (R. 461) - Court's Exhibit II). Then
the trial court plotted its mathematically determined
line on Exhibit P-45 and notes that it gives a noticably different line. Of course it does. What else did
the trial court expect? The City's line was determined
from measured annual (January 1 - December 31)
mn-off whereas the trial court's line was determined
from measured water year (October 1 - September
30) run-off, which are entirely different figures and
of necessity will result in different lines. Yet the trial
court over looked this basic difference and erroneously assumed the annual and water year run-off to be
the same. Such erroneous assumption led the trial
court down the path to its inevitable prejudicial error.
The trial court then noted that to it the significance of the difference between the two lines on Exhibit P-45 was that if the court's line was correct and
the City's line was incorrect all of the City's compiitations for computed run-off would likewise be incorrect and the City's exhibits plotting computed run-off
against measured run-off and the residual curve
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drawn therefrom would have no probative value nor
would the opinioris based thereon (R. 461).
In a tenacious effort to prove the accuracy of its
line, the trial court mathematically computed its own
schedule of effective precipitation at Silver Lake by
using the water year (October 1 - September 30)
precipitation taken from Exhibit P-15 and by making
what it considered to be appropriate additions and
deductions at 11 % in accordance with the formula it
took from Water Supply Paper 1541-B (R. 461, 462).
Thus it applied Peck's carry-over coefficient of .11
for Big Cottonwood Creek to the total water year
(October 1 - September 30) precipitation, ignoring
the fact that Peck's coefficient of .11 as used by the
City applies only to the October through April precipitation for the previous year. It then arbitrarily applied the coefficient of .89 to the current water year
precipitation, apparently to make the sum of the coefficients equal to 1.00 (R. 462 - Court's Exhibit
III).
Then came the amazing part as quoted from
page 133 of the trial court's Memorandum Decision
(R. 286):
"I then plotted effective precipitation as
thus computed for each year from 1917
through 1964 with measured annual runoff
(water year) for Big Cottonwood Creek, as
contained in P-11 and P-12 and the record, and
by use of a computer at the University of Utah,
(made available through the assistance of rny
son) determined the equation of the desired
slope line to be
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"Y = 1428 X - 9457 (See Court's
Exhibit IV)
and plotted the line on my own graph. (See
Court Exhibit V). Also by use of the computer, the computed runoff values were determined for this line for use in plotting my own
double mass curve of computed runoff vs.
measured runoff. (See Court's Exhibit VI)."
The foregoing is embodied in the Findings on
page 147 thereof (R. 462) except that the language
"(made available through the assistance of my son)"
is conspicuously omitted therefrom, all of which
points up what we consider to be a flagrant violation
of the basic concepts of competency and admissibility
of evidence, to-wit:
1. The person who programmed the University of Utah computer (apparently the trial
judge's son) was not under oath and was not
examined as a witness.Yet the computer printout entitled "Lee Croft Water Case" (Court's
Exihibit IV) was the end product of the program fed into the computer and was considered as evidence by the trial court upon which
its ultimate Finding was based.
2. The plaintiff was not afforded its
fundamental right of cross examination of the
programmer to test the accuracy of his program or to determine whether it was "debugged" or that he fed accurate basic data which
was in evidence to the computer and programmed the computer to make relevant and proper
mathematical computations of basic data.
3. Plaintiff was not afforded its fundamental right of offering evidence in rebuttal
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of the facts developed by the trial court, which
the trial court effectively offered and received
into evidence without affording the plaintiff
the right to object thereto.
We say that the above in and of itself is clearly
prejudicial error. However, there is more. The trial
court then, by use of the same computer and presumably with the same programmer, computed run-off
values for its determined line (R. 462) and plotted
its own double mass curve of computed run-off versus
measured run-off (Court's Exhibit VII). Even the
court's curve shows a divergence towards the computed coordinate (i.e. measured run-off became less
than the computed run-off) beginning in 1933, which
supports the City's claim and substantiates the
change in the relationship demonstrated on the City's
Exhibit P-46 as beginning in 1931 (R. 449, 450).
However, the trial court simply ignores that fact and
notes only that its cumulative total divergence is less
than the City's, which is
(R. 462).
What is important is that a change in the slope of
the line occurred beginning in 1933, as shown by the
Court's Exhibit VII, and continued thereafter, demonstrating that a factor or factors other than precipitation had caused less measured run-off after the
year 1933 than before for the same effective precipitation.
The trial court than prepared a corresponding
residual curve (Court's Exhibit VIII) using its own
data, and noted that in 1933 the slope of its curve reversed from an upward direction to a downward di30

rection, and thereafter continued downward with
slight deviations until it centered about the X axis
(R. 462). This curve is consistent with the City's
corresponding residual curve as shown on Exhibit
P-47. Both curves amplify that a change in the relationship between measured run-off and computed
run-off occurred in 1933 (Court's Exhibit VIII) or
1931 (Exh. P-47) which continued thereafter. Had
no change in relationship occurred, or had only temporary changes occurred, both curves would have
taken on a crude form of the "sine" curve or wavy
line as is demonstrated by the residual curve for Littie Cottonwood Creek ( Exh. P-53). Again the trial
· court ignored the real significance of its residual
curve, i.e. the reverse in slope in 1933, and concerned
itself only with the fact that its residual curve ended
up on the X axis ( R. 463) .
The trial court then reached the astonishing conclusion that, based upon its formula for the line and
its computed run-off, the total cumulative computed
run-off for the 48 years period is only 150 acre feet
more than the total cumulative measured run-off (R.
463), as :if that proved the accuracy of its curves and
completely shot down the City's case. What else did
the trial court expect when its residual curve was
based upon a balanced line which theoretically had as
many points equal distance above the line as below?
If one adds them all up, considering those above as
positive and those below as negative, it should end up
with zero, as should the mathematical summation of
the residual differences.
1
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The sum and substance of the above is that even
the Court's Exhibits VII and VIII substantiate the
fact that there has been a significant change in the
relationship between discharge of Big Cottonwood
Creek and the effective precipitation beginning in
about 1933. Since that time there has been less annual
run-off for the same amount of effective precipitation. Most important is that the decrease in run-off
must be attributable to some factor or factors other
than precipitation. That fact was demonstrated by
the trial court's own curves which it either overlooked or ignored and concerned itself only with petty
differences between its curves and the corresponding
curves of the City.
Next the trial court took off on a ''least squares"
escapade suggested by non-evidentiary Water Supply
Paper 1541-B to test the accuracy of the .11 carry
over coefficient used by the City in determining effective precipitation ( R. 463). It concluded that the
carry over coefficient of .18 was the most accurate
as determined by the least squares method and, therefore, the .11 carry over coefficient used by the City
was open to question ( R. 463, 464) . In so doing the
trial court ignored the fact that the .11 carry over
coefficient developed by Peck specifically for Big Cottonwood Creek was placed in evidence by the Mining
Company and was used by the City and as such was
accepted by both parties as being accurate. Thus it
was clearly improper for the trial court to use the
empirical formula taken from non-evidentiary Water
Supply Paper 1541-B and develop its own coefficient.
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The sum and substance of it all is that the City's
effective precipitation graphs demonstrated a cumulative decrease in the run-off of Big Cottonwood
Creek at both the mouth and at Argenta beginning
in about 1931, with no similar decrease in the run-off
from Little Cottonwood Creek (R. 450). Significantly the Mining Company offered no similar graphs in
evidence to show such comparisons. Obviously concerned, the trial court made a critical review of the
City's graphs. In so doing the trial court made a series
of erroneous basic assumptions which raised some
question in its mind as to the accuracy of the City's
Exhibits and conclusions therefrom. The trial court
then undertook a study of its own, and in so doing
committed error by resorting to evidence outside of
the record in this case as well as outside assistance.
In a determined effort to become even more expert
than the expert witnesses, the trial court led itself
into a maze of computations and the preparation of
its own exhibits, culminating in erroneous conclusions and prejudicial error.
The courts have consistently held that a judicial
decision based upon the trial judge's own knowledge,
without reference to the evidence, is improper. To allow otherwise would deprive the losing party of the
right of cross examination and would deny him the
benefit of testing the credibility of the evidence upon
which the decision was based. The general rule was
stated by this Court in Provo River Water Users Association v. Carlson, 103 Utah 93, 133 P.2d 777
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(1943) on page 782 of the Pacific Reporter as follows:
"Jurors as well as judges must base their
verdicts or decisions on evidence presented
during the trial, not on the basis of some independent personal investigation or determination of the facts outside of court."
The foregoing rule was re-affirmed by this Court in
State Road Commission v. White, 22 Utah 2d 102,
449 P.2d 114 (1969).
It has been consistently held to be reversible
error for the trial court to consider facts outside of
the record in reaching its decision. Thus, in Dade
County Medical Association v. Samartino, 213 So. 2d
627 (Fla. 1968) an action was commenced by a doctor
to enjoin a medical association from restricting the
use of specialty headings for doctors in the telephone
dir.ectory. On page 631 thereof it was stated:
"The record discloses that the judge received letters and telephone calls which he considered in his determination of the case. It is
the duty of a judge trying to cause to consider
only facts established by the record. He cannot
consider facts outside the record of which he
has personal knowledge (citation omitted).
We, therefore, conclude that the appellants
have demonstrated error under their fourth
point.
The judgment must be reversed and the
cause remanded because the appellants have
demonstrated harmful error."
In Siebert v. Siebert, 200 A. 2d 258 (Vt. 1964)
the trial judge went to considerable length in des34

cribing the backgrounds and philosophies of the parties in a divorce action based upon his personal acquaintance with them. On appeal the decision was
reversed and on page 259 thereof it was stated:
"For a court, or trier of facts, to base a
finding on personal knowledge obtained as an
observer outside of court, or from a place other
than the witness stand, is improper and prejudicial.''
"To allow a judge to make a finding on
his individual knowledge of disputed facts material to the case, not testified to by witnesses
in court, or upon its own private opinion, would
be most dangerous and unjust. It would deprive the losing party of cross examination,
and the benefit of all tests of credibility which
the law affords."
In Town of Brookline v. Town of Newfane, 224
A. 2d 908 (Vt. 1966), where the chairman of a commission appointed to hold hearings and make findings on the location of a boundary between two towns
interviewed witnesses out of court and examined documents outside of the evidence, it was held to be prejudicial error. On pages 910, 911 thereof it was stated:
HThe chairman's independent inquiry
was an unjudicial excursion out of the presence of the parties and the other members of
the commission. The interview of witnesses
out of court and the examination of documents
outside of the evidence, made the trier o'f the
facts in effect an unsworn witness. This action
deprived the defendant of any opportunity to
cross examine or to understand what evidence
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it was called upon to meet or upon what consideration the findings would rest. However
well intended, the resort to such procedure is
inherently prejudicial. (Citations omitted)."
In Valdez v. Moffat County, 423 P.2d 7 (Colo.
1967) the decision of the trial court was based in
part on the personal knowledge of the trial judge of
the operation of the hospital. In reversing the trial
court the Supreme Court stated on page 10 hereof as
follows:
"The interest of justice demands that determination in judicial
be made
upon information p1·esented to the court by
pleadings, arguments and evidence, and not by
substitution of knowledge from sources peculiarly within the knowledge of the court."
In vVells v. T¥ ells, 406 S.W. 2d 157 (Ky. 1966)
the trial judge considered confidential reports not a
part of the record in making his decision in a child
custody proceeding. On appeal it was held that such
conduct constituted reversible error. On page 158
thereof it was stated:·
"Individual or extra-judicial knowledge
on the part of the judge, not the subject of judicial notice, cannot form the basis for findings
of fact or the decision of a case (citation omitted).
"For these reasons it is doubtful if the
confidential reports would have been admissible as evidence in this case. In such posture
of the case the chancellor may have decided the
question of custody on a matter not in evidence
and outside the record which cannot be reviewed by this court. This is reversible error."
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In Utah Construction Company v. Berg, 205 P.2d
367 (Ariz. 1949) an appeal was made from an industrial commission award for total disability due to silicosis complicated by tuberculosis. In setting aside the
award the court stated on page 371 thereof as follows:
"Certainly the award cannot rest upon the
observations as to dust conditions prevailing
at Davis Dam gleaned from a visit there by one
of the commissioners (one of the two quasijudicial officers who signed the award) and
the commission's referee. From time immemorial the law has been 'that a presiding judge
cannot give judgment on his personal and private knowledge ... ' (citation omitted). The
observation and state of mind of these officials
is no substitute for evidence."
In Gibson v. Von Glahn Hotel, 185 N.Y.S. 154
(1920) the issue was whether a certain building was
a "hotel" so as to subject the defendant to absoulte
liability of innkeepers at common law. The trial judge
stated that he knew the building was a hotel from personal knowledge, and so ruled as a matter of law. In
reversing the trial court the Supreme Court of New
York stated on page 156 thereof as follows:
"The determination of the question by the
court upon its own knowledge, without reference to the evidence, was improper. The determination of a fact can only be founded upon
evidence of witnesses. The court has no right,
irrespective of the testimony of witnesses, to
determine a fact based upon its own knowledge."
We respectfully submit that under the authori37

ties cited above the trial court committed prejudicial
error in conducting its study in the manner which it
did. Accordingly, the Judgment of the trial court
must be reversed.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS
ULTIMATE FINDING THAT THE CITY FAILED TO PROVE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF
THEEVIDENCETHATTHEREHASBEENAN
UNNATURAL DECREASE IN THE FLOW OF
BIG COTTONWOOD CREEK SINCE THE DRIVING OF THE SPIRO TUNNEL.

Since this action is for equitable relief, it is the
responsibility of this Court under the Constitution
to review the evidence. Constitution of Utah, Article
VIII, Section 9; Rule 72 (a), U.R.C.P.; Nokes v. Cor1r
tinental Mining & Milling Company, 6 Utah 2d 177,
308 P.2d 954 ( 1957). And it is the prerogative and
duty of this Court under the Constitution to review
the evidence in equity cases and to modify or make
new findings if the record compels it, First Security
Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Demiris, 10 Utah 2d 405, 354
P.2d 97 ( 1960). Likewise this Court has the authority to reverse the judgment on the facts, Barker v.
Dunham, 9 Utah 2d 244, 342 P.2d 867 (1959). However, we recognize that this Court will make allow·
ances for the advantaged position of the trial judge
and will not distrub his findings and judgment unless
it appears that the evidence clearly preponderates
against them or that he has so abused his discretion
or misapplied the law that an injustice has resulted,
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Corbet v. Corbet, 24 Utah 2d 378, 472 P.2d 430
(1970).

The posture of this case is unlike the ordinary
case where the trial court expressly finds the ultimate facts against the appellant. Here the trial court
did not make an express finding that there has been
no unnatural decrease in the flow of Big Cottonwood
Creek since the driving of the Spiro Tunnel. It simply
found that the City had failed to sustain its burden
of proof thereon. This it did after making its own
study where it erroneously resorted to non-evidentiary matters outside of the record, culminating in
its nine court exhibits and its erroneous conclusions
therefrom. That in and of itself was reversible error
which requires that its ultimate finding be set aside.
The City conceded that it had the burden of proving that there had been a decrease in the flow of Big
Cottonwood Creek since the driving of the Spiro Tunnel. However, it does not concede that it had the burden
of proving that the decrease resulted from the
d•. v·n:i
of the Spiro Tunnel and its connected workings as discussed under Point III of Appellant's Brief
herein. Once the decrease in the flow of Big Cottonwood Creek was established the burden of proof shifted to the Mining Company to establish by at least the
preponderance of the evidence that the Spiro Tunnel
and its connected workings do not drain away waters
naturally tributary to Big Cottonwood Creek.
Thus the question then becomes whether the evi39

dence as shown by the record herein clearly preponderates in favor of a finding that the City did sustain
its burden of proving a decrease in the flow of Big
Cottonwood Creek since the driving of the Spiro Tunnel. The City respectfully submits that it does.
In meeting its burden the City placed into evidence hydrographs and double mass analyses of
stream flow comparisons and comparisons of computed run-off with measured run-off based upon effective precipitation, comparisons of the Spiro Tunnel flows with the flows of Big Cottonwood Creek at
Argenta and the opinions of the City's expert witness
John A. Ward. The City's evidence thereon in the
main is summarized as follows :
A. H ydrographs
Exhibits P-16 and P-17 show comparisons between the measured discharges of Big Cottonwood
Creek, City Creek and Little Cottonwood Creek, with
five-year averages both on a water year and first six
months of the water year basis. Those hydrographs
are graphical representations of what the records of
measured flows show. There has been no "doctoring"
of the records to adjust for any inconsistencies. If
any adjustments or corrections were needed, they
were made at the time the water was measured with
the objective of obtaining the most accurate measure·
ment of flow under the then existing conditions. As
such, those hydrographs show
( 1) That there has been a decrease in
the flow of Big Cottonwood Creek; and
40

(2) That neither City Creek nor Little
Cottonwood Creek has sustained a similar decrease.
Thus, the decrease in Big Cottonwood Creek as
demonstrated thereon with no similar decrease in
either City Creek or Little Cottonwood Creek is evidence that the decrease in Big Cottonwood Creek is
an unnatural loss.
Exhibit P-18 comprising 48 sheets of hydrographs of the natural flow of Big Cottonwood Creek
at Argenta covering the period 1916 through 1963,
inclusive, demonstrates that the pre-1931 base flows
of Big Cottonwood Creek are consistently higher than
the post-1931 base flows. Exhibit P-19 covering the
same period shows the same post-1931 reduction in
the base flow of Big Cottonwood Creek at Argenta
for the water year and for the first six months of the
water year and that such reduction is unrelated to
precipitation. Both exhibits consistently show a persistent decrease in the base flow of Big Cottonwood
Creek beginning in 1931 and continuing thereafter
which is unrelated to variations in precipitation.
B. Double Mass Analysis

Double mass curves are a method of comparing
the accumulated discharge of one stream against another or against a combination of streams forming a
base to determine whether any change in the relationship between the two has occurred. Thus if a persistent change in the relationship occurs the curve will
deviate from the established slope of the line at about
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the time the persistent change began. As applied here,
such deviation reflects either a persistent decrease
in the discharge of one stream or an increase in the
other, but does not in and of itself pinpoint which.
If the double mass curves are to have any probative value as evidence of a decrease in stream flow the
basis thereof must lend itself to logic and reason as a
means of formulating valid conclusions as to which
stream has decreased. That is why the single station
comparisons used by the City are by far the better in
this case. For it is by this method that the stream
which deviates can be isolated.
Thus in Exhibits P-21 and P-25 (being double
mass comparisons between Big Cottonwood Creek
and Little Cottonwood Creek) a marked deviation begins in approximately 1925 to 1927, demonstrating
either a relative loss in Big Cottonwood Creek or a
relative gain in Little Cottonwood Creek. In Exhibits
P-24 and P-43 (being double mass comparisons between Big Cottonwood Creek and City Creek) a
marked deviation begins in approximately 1925 to
1927, which shows either a relative loss in Big Cottonwood Creek or a relative gain in City Creek. And
in Exhibits P-28 and P-30 (being double mass com·
parisons between Little Cottonwood Creek and City
Creek) no significant change in relationship appears
between those two streams. It must be concluded
therefrom that either Big Cottonwood Creek has de·
creased or that both City Creek and Little Cotton·
wood Creek have increased at the same time and by
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the same amount. Logic tells us that it is more probable that Big Cottonwood Creek has decreased.
When the same comparisons are made between
Big Cottonwood Creek at Argenta, being farther upstream, and Little Cottonwood Creek (Exhs. P-34,
P-37) and City Creek (Exhs. P-31, P-36) the same
relative deviation appears. This adds to the probability of the decrease in the flow of Big Cottonwood
Creek.
The double mass comparisons of the discharge
of Big Cottonwood Creek above Argenta against the
discharge below Argenta (Exhs. P-33, 41B) demonstrate a change in the relationship between the two.
Logic tells us that there is a greater relative decrease
in the discharge from upper Big Cottonwood Creek
than from lower Big Cottonwood Creek.
Double mass comparisons were then made by
the City to determine whether the above demonstrated decreases in Big Cottonwood Creek were related
to any change in precipitation patterns. The Mining
Company made no similar comparisons, and it was
this series of the City's exhibits which the trial court
misinterpreted and as a result engaged in its extrajudicial study discussed under Point I above.
Thus Exhibit P-46 (being a double mass comparison between accumulated measured run-off and
accumulated computed run-off of Big Cottonwood
Creek based on e'ffective preciptation at Silver Lake)
demonstrates that a change in the relationship occur43

red in 1931 and thereafter the measured run-off decreased for the same effective precipitation over the
previous period. This change in relationship is verified by the residual mass curves shown in Exhibit
P-47. A similar decrease in the accumulated measured run-off compared against accumulated computed
run-off at Argenta based on effective precipitation
at Silver Lake is demonstrated on Exhibit P-51 and
is verified by its residual mass curve in Exhibit P-52.
The same comparisons were made for Little Cottonwood Creek based on effective precipitation at
Silver Lake ( Exh. P-49). The results thereof show
no material change in the relationship between accumulated measured run-off and computed run-off
of Little Cottonwood Creek based upon effective pre·
cipitation at Silver Lake. This conclusion is verified
by the residual mass curve of Little Cottonwood
Creek ( Exh. P-53) . The foregoing again substanti·
ates a decrease in the run-off of Big Cottonwood
Creek that is not attributable to a change in precipi·
tation.
In a nutshell, the single station plots adapt themselves to reliable conclusions based upon logic and
reasoning and a systematic process of elimination
will demonstrate whether the suspect stream has sus·
tained a decrease in run-off. Here the comparisons
made by the City as demonstrated in the various exhibits clearly show by logic and reasoning that Big
Cottonwood Creek has sustained an unnatural de44

cl'ease in its run-off which is unrelated to variations
in precipitation.

C. Comparison of Spiro Tunnel Flow to Flow
at Argenta
Exhibit P-61 graphically demonstrates the concurrent measured flows of Big Cottonwood Creek at
Argenta and the discharge of the Spiro Tunnel. The
correlation in timing between the increase in the discharge df the Spiro Tunnel and the corresponding decrease at Argenta and vice versa clearly shows the
direct relationship between the two. That exhibit tells
the story as no other single exhibit can. The inescapable conclusion therefrom is that the Spiro Tunnel
and its connected underground workings are taking
water away from Big Cottonwood Creek.
D. Watershed Yields Per Unit Area

Exhibit P-62 compares the discharge of water
per unit area of watershed among the various
streams. It is elementary that the upper watersheds
should yield more water per unit area than the lower
watersheds simply because more precipitation falls
in the higher elevations. The shocking fact demonstrated by Exhibit P-62 is that the upper 10.54 square
miles of the Big Cottonwood drainage which should
be by far the best producing watershed yields less
than between one-fifth and one-tenth as much water
per unit area of watershed than does the lower reaches of Big Cottonwood Creek, Mill D South Fork,
Little Cottonwood Creek, City Creek or the upper
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reaches of Mill Creek. What is even more shocking is
that the upper reaches of Big Cottonwood Creek per
unit of drainage area yield approximately one-fifth
of Thayne's Canyon Creek on the Park City side of
the mountain where the annual precipitation is substantially less. And if the discharge of the Spiro Tunnel is added to Thayne's Canyon Creek the combined
yield per unit areas is about nineteen times as much
as the yield per unit area of upper Big Cottonwood
Creek. It is obvious therefrom that the upper Big Cottonwood Creek drainage is losing water. Reason and
logic from the above tells us that it is being lost to the
Spiro Tunnel and its connected underground workings.
E. Opinion of John A. Ward
The experience of Mr. Ward in the field of
ground water hydrology was unmatched by any of
the Mining Company's experts. He is a graduate civil
engineer specializing in ground water hydrology. He
worked in the Salt Lake City Water Department from
1934 to 1941 and for the next 13 years was employed
by the Utah State Engineer in charge of ground water development throughout the state. Since that time
he has acted as a consultant in the field of ground
water hydrology. He conducted many ground water
investigations and devoted an equivalent of three full
years to his study in this case. Although the qualifications and credibility of the witnesses are generally
for the trial court to pass on, the qualifications of Mr.
Ward should be considered by this Court in determin·
ing where the evidence preponderates.
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Mr. Ward expressed the firm opinion that there
has been an unnatural decrease of between 12 and 15
cfs at the mouth of Big Cottonwood Creek (Tr. 1056)
and between 9 and 12 cfs at Argenta (Tr. 1060). It
was not from any one single hydrograph, double mass
plot or stream flow record upon which Mr. Ward
based his opinion (Tr. 1104). Rather, his opinion
was based upon the combined results of all studies,
investigations, comparisons and his intimate and detailed personal knowledge of the hydrologic characteristics of Big Cottonwood Creek, the measuring devices employed and the like. Mr. Ward did not attribute the full 12 to 15 cfs of loss to the Spiro Tunnel
workings. He was of the view that other mine workings on the Park City side of the mountain were also
draining water away (Tr. 1210). Mr. Ward was of
the opinion that at least 90 % of the water developed
within the Spiro Tunnel beyond the 6600 station was
Big Cottonwood Creek water (Tr. 1088, 1205). And
the waters developed within the 143 Drift measured
at about 6 cfs by the Mining Company and about 7
cfs by Mr. Ward make up the principal flow from the
Spiro Tunnel.
The sum and substance of it all is that every hydrograph of direct streamflow comparisons prepared
by the City demonstrates a loss in the flow of Big Cottonwood Creek both at Argenta and at the mouth relative to City Creek and Little Cottonwood Creek.
Such hydrographs further show that the post-1931
base flow of Big Cottonwood Creek is consistently
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lower than the pre-1931 base flows. Likewise every
double mass comparison between Big Cottonwood
Creek and City Creek or Little Cottonwood Creek
made by the City shows a relative decrease in Big
A"J.:::'t,._
Cottonwood Creek both at . A_..rg1teta
.
and the mouth beginning between 1924 and 1927. Comparisons between the discharge of the Spiro Tunnel and Big Cottonwood Creek at Argenta show decreases in the flow
at Argenta corresponding with increases in the discharge of the Spiro Tunnel with the driving of the
143 Drift and vice versa. The yield per unit of upper
Big Cottonwood watershed is shockingly low in comparison with adjoining watersheds and particularly
when compared with the Thayne's Canyon watershed
both with and without augmentation by the discharge
of the Spiro Tunnel. The above comparisons coupled
with the opinions of the City's witness John A. Ward
clearly and convincingly show the unnatural loss in
the flow of Big Cottonwood Creek.
On the other hand, the Mining Company's evidence taken as a whole was essentially negative on
this point. Its hydrographs of stream flow comparisons were divided into periods which tended to offset
demonstrated losses from one period to another (R.
403). However, the 8, 16 and 24 year comparisons
made by the trial court show, with some exceptions,
that the flow in Big Cottonwood Creek at both Ar·
genta and at the mouth generally was less than for
other Wasatch front streams except for Mill Creek
(R. 452).
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The Mining Company's series of double mass
comparisons show breaks in the slopes of the curves
in varying years with no definitive conclusions (R.
468). However, the Mining Company's witness Jay
N. Bagley concluded that such curves show a real
change in the flow of Big Cottonwood Creek from
1928 to 1935 and that a 1920 break could have been
caused by the Spiro Tunnel ( R. 452). In its double
mass curves, using the four station base, Big Cottonwood Creek was included therein and represents
56% of the average run-off of the base which influences the result (R. 451). Thus the inclusion of Big
Cottonwood Creek in the base tends to cancel out or
dampen any change in the relationship between Big
Cottonwood Creek and the base (Tr. 3294, 3314).
The Mining Company's double mass curves using its
eight station base did not include Big Cottonwood
Creek but did include the Weber River at Oakely, Logan River and Blacksmith's Fork Creek. The latter
streams, being substantial distances away and hardly
being comparable to the much smaller Wasatch front
streams, raises a substantial doubt about the weight
of such evidence on the issues of this case ( R. 452) .
Likewise the Mining Company's expert witnesses were negative but vague in their opinions. The
witness M. T. Wilson, who had never measured Big
Cottonwood Creek either at Argenta or at the mouth
(Tr. 2870) or City Creek or Little Cottonwood
Creek (Tr. 2871) and who first became familiar with
the measuring station at Argenta just the summer
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before the trial (Tr. 2870), expressed a negative
opinion. He was of the view that the discharge of Big
Cottonwood Creek has not lost water in relation to
the discharge of other streams where the drainage
of those other streams has been collected at the same
location and under the same conditions with the possible exception of some loss to Little Cottonwood
Creek (Tr. 2868). However, he had no opinion as to
the source of the Spiro Tunnel waters (Tr. 2869).
The Mining Company's witness Jay N. Bagley
was vague and evasive in his opinions (Tr. 31503159, incl.) and in substance could not express an
opinion one way or the other (Tr. 3155). However,
he did submit that the Spiro Tunnel could be drawing
water away which otherwise would have found its
way into Big Cottonwood Creek, but thought that the
Ontario Tunnel or other tunnels had a larger effect
by the time the Spiro Tunnel came along (Tr. 3158).
And so we submit that the evidence as a whole
clearly preponderates in favor of the Finding that
there has been an unnatural decrease in the flow of
Big Cottonwood Creek. Although the City strongly
disagrees with the ultimate Finding of the trial court
on this fact, it does not intend hereby to be critical of
the time and effort which the trial court devoted to
this case save and except for its going beyond the record. However, it is obvious that the trial court in its
determined effort to master the myriad of technical
details became so engulfed in it all that it lost sight of
the end result demonstrated collectively by the exhib·
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its and testimony in this case. It became so involved
in the detail of its own extra-judicial study that it
could not take an objective over-view of the evidence
offered by the parties litigant. As a result the trial
court not only committed prejudicial error but reached a conclusion contrary to the clear preponderance
of the evidence.
The City respectfully submits that a review of
the record requires a reversal of the Judgment made
and entered by the trial court. Likewise, a review of
the evidence in the record compels a Finding that
there has been an unnatural decrease in the flow of
Big Cottonwood Creek of at least 9 cfs at Argenta
and of at least 12 cfs at the mouth since the driving
of the Spiro Tunnel. Accordingly, the City respectfully requests this Court to make and enter its own
Findings thereon on the basis of the record before it.
POINT III.
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
DEMONSTRATES THAT THE SPIRO TUNNEL
AND ITS C 0 N N E CT E D UNDERGROUND
WORKINGS INTERCEPT AND COLLECT WATERS WHICH ARE NATURALLY TRIBUTARY
TO BIG COTTONWOOD CREEK.

The trial court made no Findings Of Fact on the
causal connection between the waters intercepted and
collected within the Spiro Tunnel and its connected
underground workings and the waters of Big Cottonwood Creek. We respectfully submit that the record
compels a Finding that such causal connection exists
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and that the Spiro Tunnel and its connected underground workings are draining away the waters of I
the Big Cottonwood Creek drainage. Accordingly,
this Court has not only the prerogative but the duty
to make and enter such Finding. First Security Bank
of Utah, N.A. v. Demiris, supra.
The City accepted as its initial responsibility the
burden of producing evidence to show an unnatural
decrease in the flow of Big Cottonwood Creek attributable to the Spiro Tunnel and its connected underground workings, but did not assume the ultimate
burden of proof or persuasion on that issue. The trial
court was of the opinion that the burden is on the City
of going forward with the evidence to at least prove
that there has been an unnatural decrease in the flow
of Big Cottonwood Creek that could reasonably be believed to have some relationship to the driving of the
Spiro Tunnel (R. 265). However, it apparently
changed from its "burden of producing evidence"
view (Rule 1 ( 5) U. R. E. ) to a '''burden of proof" view
(Rule 1(4) U.R.E.) that the City had the burden to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there
had been an unnatural decrease in the flow of Big
Cottonwood Creek that might reasonably be attributable to the driving of the Spiro Tunnel ('R. 266).
The law is well settled in Utah that the burden I
of proof is upon one who claims to have developed :
underground waters to prove by a perponderance of 1
the evidence that he is not intercepting the tributaries
of appropriated streams or sources of supply of prior '.
1
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appropriators. Moitntain Lakes Mining Company v.
Midway Irrigation Company, 47 Utah 346, 149 P.
929 ( 1915) ; Bastian v. Nebeker, 49 Utah 390, 163
P.1092 (1916, 1917); Petersenv. Wood, 71Utah77,
262 P. 828 (1927); Silver King Consolidated Mining
Company v. Sutton, supra; Midway Irrigation Compa.ny v. Snake Creek Mining & Tunnel Company, 271
Fed. 157 (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1921); Snake Creek Mining & Tunnel Company v. Midway Irrigation Con?r
pany, 260 U.S. 596, 43 S. Ct. 215, 67 L. Ed. 423
(1923); Little Cottonwood Water Company v. Sandy
City, 123 Utah 242, 258 P.2d 440 (1953); 2 Kinney
on Irrigation, Section 1202; 2 Weil on Water Rights,
Section 1082.
In Mountain Lakes Mining Company v. Midway
Irrigation Company, supra, this Court adopted the
rule as set forth in Kinney, supra, wherein it was
stated on page 360 of the Utah Reports as follows:
"The burden of proof is upon one who has
discovered certain subterranean water and
claiming the same to show that such water is,
in fact, 'developed water.' Therefore, whoever
asserts that he is entitled to the exclusive use
of water by reason of having discovered and
'developed' the same must assure the court, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that he is not
intercepting tributaries of the main stream or
other body to the waters of which others are
entitled."
This Court also noted therein that the presumption
is, until overcome by satisfactory proof, that the intercepted water is tributary to the main stream.
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Under the foregoing rule it matters not who is
plaintiff or who is defendant. Thus in Midway Irri.
gation Company v. Snake Creek Mining & Tunnel
Company, supra, the District Court held that the
prior appropriator had the burden of proof. In reversing the District Court, the Circuit Court of Appeals squarely held that the burden of proof was on
the mining company and followed the rule as announced in Mountain Lakes Mining Company v. Midway Irrigation Company, supra . The opinion of the
Circuit Court was thereafter affirmed by the United
States Supreme Court in Snake Creek Mining & Tunnel Company v. Midway Irrigation Company, supra.

Nor does it matter that the Spiro Tunnel was
driven from the other side of the mountain since we
are dealing with a common ground water bedrock
reservoir. The extent thereof .fi determined by its
complex plumbing system of joints, cracks and fis·
sures and not by the surface topographical divide
(Tr. 1336, 1337, 1341, 1345, 3157). The test is one
of "close proximity to the source" of the stream under
Mountain Lakes Mining Company v. Midway Irriga·
lion Company, supra, and Silver King Consolidated
Mining Company v. Sutton, supra. Here the inner
workings of the Spiro Tunnel are within the common
ground water bedrock reservoir, and particularly the
143 Drift with its face being practically in the center
of the bedrock reservoir (Tr. 1465), which is the
source of supply to Big Cottonwood Creek. Therefore,
this case is squarely within the general rule. Accord·
54

ingly, the Mining Company has the ultimate burden
of persuasion on this point.
The evidence relating to the inter-connection between the Spiro Tunnel workings and the waters of
Big Cottonwood Creek consisted of basic physical
facts, surface and underground geology, the location
and extent of the Spiro Tunnel mine workings, other
mine workings, hydrographs and the opinions of expert witnesses.
The physical fact most basic to this case is that
all four of the geologic rock formations penetrated
by the Spiro Tunnel and its connected workings outcrop on the northern slope of the Big Cottonwood
Canyon drainage. Those formations are conformable and dip downwards to the northeast into the
Park City side, where they are encountered by the
Spiro Tunnel and its connected workings some 2,000
feet below (Tr. 1307, 1460, 1461, 1463).
The waters about which we are here concerned
are those intercepted and collected by the Spiro Tunworkings within the Park City formation and
the Weber Quartzite. The surface outcrops of those
two formations in the upper Big Cottonwood Creek
drainage cover an area of about two and one-half
square miles and continue without break underneath
Thayne's Canyon as encountered in the Spiro Tunnel and its connected workings (Tr. 1460, 1461.)
The Woodside shale formation which overlies the
Park City formation effectively acts as a cover that
retards the downward movement of water from the
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surface on the Thayne's Canyon side into the under. '
lying formations (T. 1571).
'
1

The underground bedrock reservoir in the area
comprising the upper Big Cottonwood, Thayne's,
White Pine Canyon and adjacent drainage basins is
a common reservoir unseparated physically by any
partition or other barrier (Tr. 1458). The water
which finds its way into the reservoir is controlled
in its movement by a so-called plumbing system comprising the openings and passageways within the rock
body under the influence of gravity (Tr. 1458, 1459).
The direction of the movement of the water is con·
trolled by the trend of the joint systems and majorfis.
sures (Tr. 1556). The most important passageways
are fissures, being areas of crushed or broken rock
(Tr. 1459).
There is a large igneous rock extrusion (pluton)
referred to in the evidence as the "fish" (because of
the shape of its outcrop) which extends from the Big
Cottonwood side across Scott's Pass and onto the
Thayne's Canyon side (Exh. P-3, Tr. 1285, 1460).
The contact or margin of the igneous pluton is a zone
of highly fractured rock saturated with water (Tr.
1460). The general trend of the fissures at the head
of Thayne's Canyon is in an easterly and westerly
direction (Tr. 1460). There are faults crossing the
divide between Big Cottonwood Canyon and Thayne's
Canyon (R. 434, Exhs. P-2, P-3, Tr. 1317).
There is fracturing in the Weber Quartzite along
the Spiro Tunnel ( R. 330) and large numbers of·
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fractures and zones of fracturing and small faults
are crossed by the 143 Drift as it courses through the
Park City formation and Weber Quartzite (Exhs.
P-57a-d, incl., Tr. 1593). The West End Shaft encountered fissures within the Weber Quartzite that
were main conduits of water (Tr. 1574). There are
local areas within the Weber Quartzite where the
rocks are sufficiently tight that they are dry or water
does not drain away freely, such as the Iowa Copper
Mine on the northern slope of Big Cottonwood Canyon and the Neutrino Chamber off the 137 Cross Cut
(Tr. 1574).

The major flows of water encountered in driving the Spiro Tunnel were within the last 500 feet of
the Park City formation below the black shale layer
and within the 2836 feet of the Weber Quartzite to its
, face ( R. 335, 336, Exh. P-55). Both sections of the
tunnel were wet and at various places under the black
shale of the Park City formation, and particularly
in the Weber Quartzite, large quantities of water
were encountered (R. 330, 331, 335, Exh. P-55). For
example, when the face was within the Weber Quartzite some 14,000 feet from the portal in February,
1921 the total flow from the tunnel was 12.9 cfs with
most of the flow coming from below the black shale
(R. 331). As the 143 Drift was driven flows were
encountered sporadically at fault systems and when
first encountered the flows were heavy and then as it
drained subsided to a lesser steady flow. The maxi.
mum flow from the 143 Drift was encountered in
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1933 when the average flow of the Spiro Tunnel was
approximately 22.0 cfs ( R. 334, Exh. P-55). In 1934
the 143 Drift averaged 13.0 cfs (R. 335).
From 1929 to 1949 water was pumped from the
West End Shaft which bottomed in the Weber Quart.
zite up into the 1057 Cross Cut (R. 336). The water
so pumped ranged from 3.13 cfs average for 1934 fo
10.0 cfs average for 1949 (R. 339, 340).
The West End Shaft and the 143 Drift are hydrologically connected by many channels (Tr. 3561).
Thus when pumping in the West End Shaft began
there was a reduction in the flow from the 143 Drift.
Likewise when pumping from the West End Shaft
was discontinued the flow from the 143 Drift increas·
ed (R. 470, Tr. 3562).
The total discharge from the Spiro Tunnel from
1916 to 1965, including the waters pumped from the
West End Shaft, was approximately 322,000 acre
feet, which is the equivalent of filling Deer Creek
Reservoir more than twice (Tr. 1571). During the
30 year period from 1931 to 1960 the discharge from
the Spiro Tunnel exceeded in every year the total pre·
cipitation which fell in the Thayne's Canyon drain·
age (Tr. 1572). In 1933 the discharge from the Spiro
Tunnel was oreand one-half times the total precipita·
tion (Tr. 1572). Yet only a small percentage of the
preciptation finds its way into the ground water res·
ervoir (Tr. 1573).
The physical facts and surface and underground
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geolfgy clearly support the inter-connection between
the Spiro Tunne!l workings and the waters of upper
Big Cottonwood Creek. Those facts and conditions all
point to the inescapable conclusion that the Spiro
Tunnel and its connected underground workings are,
and for many years have been, draining away from
the bedrock resorvoir waters which otherwise would
naturally contribute to the flow of Big Cottonwood
Creek. But most persuasive of that conclusion are the
opinions expressed by the City's witness Ray E. Marsell and the reasoning upon which his opinions are
based. The qualifications of Professor Marsell as to
experience and detailed knowledge of the geology of
the Wasatch range of mountains are unmatched by
anyone. Likewise he is probably the foremost authority on the occurrence and movement of ground water in bedrock ( Exh. P-63, Tr. 1235-1246 incl.). He
worked on his study of the relationship between the
upper Big Cottonwood area and the Spiro Tunnel
over a period of four years (Tr. 1245). The testimony of Professor Marsell in this case is a classic and
is without doubt the most lucid and comprehensive
discussion of the complex geological and hydrological
conditions which determine the occurrence and movement of ground water in bedrock and as specifically
applied to the relationship between the Spiro Tunnel
workings and the waters of upper Big Cottonwood
Creek.
Professor Marsell expressed the firm and positive opinion that the sources to the waters flowing
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in the Spiro Tunnel, excluding the waters intercepted'\
within the first 6600 feet thereof, are inter-connected
with the natural underground sources of water of
Big Cottonwood Creek (Tr. 1457, 1458). He then
gave a detailed explanation of the basis of his opinion.
Thus the underground bedrock reservoir in the area
of upper Big Cottonwood Canyon, Thayne's Canyon
and White Pine Canyon and adjacent drainage basins is a common reservoir unseparated physically
by any partition or other barriers. Once the water
reaches the bedrock reservoir its movement is then
controlled by the openings and passageways, both primary and secondary, within the rock body under the
influence of gravity and the trend and direction of
the passageways (Tr. 1457, 1458). The fissuring
and fracturing of the rock formation are such as to
provide for a plumbing system within the reservoir·
to permit the water to move from higher to lower
levels mutually on both sides of the surface divide be
tween upper Big Cottonwood Canyon and Thayne's
Canyon (Tr. 1460).
The same formations that have been encountered
in the Spiro Tunnel, notably the Park City formation
and the Weber Quartzite, are widely exposed on the
Big Cottonwood side and continue without break un·
derneath Thayne's Canyon (Tr. 1460, 1461). The
combination of local geological conditions regarding
the formations themselves which are continuous and
dip into the Park City side provide the means of the
contributions into the common bedrock reservoir
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from the Big Cottonwood side and the contributions
thereof would be larger because of greater area and
higher precipitation (Tr. 1462). And the driving of
the tunnel into the common bedrock reservoir, and
particularly the 143 Drift, would act as a pipe stuck
through the bottom of the barrel, permitting freer
avenues of escape and would tend to drain the water
more freely in that direction (Tr. 1463). Thus it
would be inevitable that the drain tunnel would drain
the water bearing areas intercepted by it that make
up the water in storage in the common bedrock mountain reservoir (Tr. 1463) and will affect the water
in storage and its elevation within the reservoir on
the Big Cottonwood side (Tr. 1464).
Professor Marsell expressed the further opinion
that not less than 90 % of the water collected within
the 143 Drift is being drained away from that part
of the ground water bedrock reservoir that underlies
the upper Big Cottonwood Canyon and had it not been
so intercepted would overflow from the reservoir and
form a part of the base flow of upper Big Cottonwood
Creek (Tr. 1465, 1466, 1593). He pointed out that
the 143 Drift crosses numerous fractures, zones of
fracturing and small faults and the face thereof is in
such a position in the middle of the common bedrock
reservoir some 2600 feet below the surface that not
less than 90 % of the water draining from the 143
Drift has its origin in practically the center of the
bedrock reservoir (Tr. 1463, 1465, 1593). Had such
waters not been intercepted the elevation of the wa61

ter in the reservoir would be higher in that part of the
reservoir and would overflow therefrom to form a
part of the base flow of upper Big Cottonwood Creek
(Tr. 1465).

Professor Marsell expressed the further opinion
that the waters intercepted by the workings within
the Park City and Weber formations connected to
the 137 Cross Cut situated north of the Crescent!
Fault have their source in the same ground water re·
servoir and would likewise affect the overflow therefrom and the base flow of upper Big Cottonwood
Creek (Tr. 1466, 1467). He then expressed the opinion that pumping from the West End Shaft would
have significantly accelerated the withdrawal of water from storage in the common mountain bedrock
reservoir and likewise would lower the water within
the plumbing system, which would reduce the former
contributions into the Big Cottonwood Creek drain·
age (Tr. 1467).

I

And so we respectfully submit that the opinions
of Professor Marsell based upon his unsurpassed
knowledge and experience, coupled with his logic and
reasoning, make it crystal clear that the Spiro Tun·
nel and its inter-connected workings have lowered the
ground water reservoir which otherwise would have
naturally contributed to Big Cottonwood Creek. And
as noted above, essentially the same conclusions were
reached by the City's witness John A. Ward based up·
on the hydrological relationships. Thus Mr. Ward
was of the firm and positive opinion that at least 90o/c
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of the water emanating from the Spiro Tunnel developed beyond the 6600 station was Big Cottonwood
Creek water (Tr.1088, 1205).

On the other hand the Mining Company's witnesses were negative but vague in their opinions. Its
witness M. T. Wilson had no opinion as to the source
of the Spiro Tunnel waters (Tr. 2869). Likewise its
witness J. N. Bagley could not express an opinion as
to the source of the waters emanating from the Spiro
Tunnel (Tr. 3155), but could not exclude the possibility that the Spiro Tunnel could be getting water
which normally would go to Big Cottonwood Creek
(Tr. 3156).
The Mining Company's witness James Ivers was
of the opinion that it was highly unlikely that any
water would enter the 143 Drift or the Silver King
Mine from the beds in the Cottonwood side (Tr.
3187), although.t' it is possible (Tr. 3188). In his
view it is more probable that the source of the waters
being drained from the 143 Drift are coming from
the Mississippian limestones on the south flank of the
Uintah range some 24 miles away (Tr. 3427), which
view even the trial court rejected (R. 451).
The Mining Company's witness Roy P. Full expressed the opinion that there are no large volumes
of water moving from the Big Cottonwood drainage
into the Spiro (Tunnel) area (Tr. 3519). It was his
view that the basil reservoir underlies the entire area,
including the Big Cottonwood area, but the major
63

movement of water in the deep reservoir is from east
to west since he can see no major structural conditions that would permit readily easy movement of wa.
ter from the east into the Big Cottonwood Creek
drainage (Tr. 3571, 3573). Yet he only studied this
specific problem in this case for approximately one
month, and his work in the field of ground water hydrology was essentially limited to the work he did in
this case (Tr. 3524, 3525).
And so we submite that on the whole the evidence
clearly preponderates in favor of a finding that the
Spiro Tunnel and its connected underground workings (excluding the first 6600 feet thereof) inter·
cepts water which otherwise would naturally con·
tribute to Big Cottonwood Creek. The Mining Company had the burden of proving that it was not inter·
cepting tributaries to Big Cottonwood Creek, which
it wholly failed to do. Accordingly this Court should
make and enter its findings on the record before it
that the Spiro Tunnel and its connected underground
workings (excluding the first 6,600 feet thereof) are
draining away waters of the upper Big Cottonwood
Creek drainage and that the City is entitled to 90%
of the flow thereof. Likewise we respectfully submit
that on the basis of the record before it this Court
should make and enter its Conclusions Of Law and
Judgment in accordance with paragraph 4 of Appel·
lant's '''Relief Sought on Appeal" as hefinabove stat·
ed.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court committed error in conducting
its own study by going outside of the record and developing its own equations and coefficients and preparing nine court's exhibits with the use of a computer at the University of Utah made available through
the assistance of the trial judge's son. The trial court
was duty bound to accept as valid the carry-over coefficients placed into evidence by the Mining Company and used by the City. The error was clearly pr0judical under the adjudicated cases, and particularly
in view of the conclusions of the trial court that if the
, results of its study were correct then the City's corresponding computations would be incorrect and the
City's corresponding exhibits would have no probative value, nor would the opinions based thereon. Such
prejudicial error requires a reversal of the Judgment
made and entered by the trial court in this case.
The evidence clearly perponderates in favor of
a finding that there has been an unnatural decrease
in the flow of Big Cottonwood Creek since the driving
of the Spiro Tunnel. This Court has the prerogative
under the Constitution of Utah to review the evidence
and make and enter its own Findings on t:re basis of
the record before it. We respectfully submit that the
record compels a finding that there has been an unnatural decrease in the flow of Big Cottonwood Creek
of at least 9 second feet at Argenta and of at least 12
second feet at the mouth since the driving of the Spiro
Tunnel.
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The Mining Company had the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that the Spiro
Tunnel and its connected workings was not intercept.
ing waters naturally tributary to Big Cottonwood
Creek. It wholly failed in meeting this burden. In fact
the evidence clearly preponderates in favor of the
finding that the Spiro Tunnel and its connected underground workings (excluding the first 6600 feet
thereof) drains away water from the common bed·
rock reservoir which otherwise would naturally con·
tribute to Big Cottonwood Creek. The trial court
made no Findings as to the causal connection between
the Spiro Tunnel workings and the waters of Big Cot·
tonwood Creek. Since this Court has the prerogative
of reviewing the evidence we respectfully submit that
it should, on the basis of the record before it, make
and enter its Findings that such causal connection
exists and that the Spiro Tunnel and its connected
underground workings (excluding the first 6600 feet
thereof) are draining away waters which otherwise
would naturally contribute to Big Cottonwood Creek
and that at least 90 % of the waters emanating from
the Spiro Tunnel beyond the 6600 station are owned
by the City. And we respectfully submit that this
Court should make and enter its Conclusions Of Law
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and Judgment awarding said water to the City and
affording the City the relief set forth in paragrah 4
of its "Relief Sought on Appeal" herein.
Repectfully submitted,
JACK L. CRELLIN
Salt Lake City Attorney
City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
JOSEPH NOV AK
520 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorneys for
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